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This paper aims at analyzing decentralization reforms in the education sector in Latin 
America (their status, impact and on-going challenges) by making use of the 
accountability  framework developed by the 2004 World Development Report. It starts 
by identifying three main groups of  models according to the sub-national actors 
involved, the pattern adopted in the distribution of functions across sub-national actors 
and the accountability system central to the model. It then reviews  the impact of  these 
models, according to the available empirical evidence, and explores determinants of this 
impact, extracting lessons useful to the design of future reforms. It concludes that the 
single most important factor in ensuring the success or failure of a reform is the way the 
accountability relationships are set to work within each of the models and provides some 
lessons on how to get these relationships to work effectively. It also provides three main 
general lessons for the selection of “successful” models: (a) avoiding complicated 
models; (b) increasing school autonomy and the scope for “client power”, maintaining a 
clear role for the other accountability relationships; and (c) putting more emphasis on the 
“management” accountability relationship and the sustainability of the models. 
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Education Decentralization and Accountability Relationships  




This paper aims at analyzing decentralization reforms in the education sector in Latin 
America (their status, impact and on-going challenges), by making use of the 
accountability framework recently developed by the 2004 World Development Report 
(WDR).  This  framework focuses on accountability mechanisms between policy-makers, 
providers and citizens/clients to explain why service delivery works or fails. In the first 
section, the paper provides a characterization of alternative decentralization reforms. It 
then reviews the impact of  these reforms and explores determinants of this impact, very 
much related to the implementation and use of  the accountability mechanisms, extracting 
lessons which should be useful to the design of future reforms.  
 
It is generally assumed that services will be provided more efficiently by sub-national 
units because they have a better knowledge of local conditions, characteristics and 
preferences than the central actor (asymmetric information argument
1). Adopting a 
principal and agent terminology, it is clear, however, that decentralizing decision making 
autonomy will not by itself be enough to ensure better provision if the new agent is not 
given the incentive to use its superior information to provide a better service. This is 
where the accountability dimension comes in. A decentralized framework of service 
delivery will work only if the agent is made accountable for its actions to the central 
actor, which decided to decentralize (and which we could see as principal number one) 
and to the community, which is the ultimate beneficiary of the services (and can be seen 
as principal number two or client)
2.  
 
Following the WDR, we detect four main types of accountability relationships:  
 
(a)  the “compact” relationship, defined as the broad, long-term relationship of 
accountability connecting policymakers to organizational providers;  
(b) the “voice” relationship, defined as the complex accountability relationship which 
connects citizens and politicians;  
(c) the “client power” relationship defined as the relationship of accountability 
connecting clients to the frontline service providers, usually at the point of service 
delivery;  
(d)  and the “management” relationship, defined as the relationship connecting 
organizational providers and frontline professionals. 
                                                 
1 This argument is, for instance, highlighted in Ugaz (1997) who considers “the improvement in the flow of 
information” to be the first channel through which decentralization can improve the quality of the services. 
It is also developed by Wossmann (2000) and Klugman (1994, 1997). 
2 The opportunity  that decentralization provides to enhance this second accountability relationship is often 
seen as another major argument for decentralization. As Wolman (1988) mentions:  “Decentralization 
fosters greater responsiveness of the decision-makers to the will and needs of the citizens because they are 
more knowledgeable about and attuned to the needs of their area than are centralized decision makers and 
because decentralization permits these decision-makers to be held directly accountable to the local citizens 
(through local elections or other means)”.   2
These accountability relationships can in turn be grouped under the “long route” to 
accountability or  the “short route” one. Through the  “long route", clients as citizens (or 
community) influence policy-makers and policy-makers, in turn, influence providers (i.e. 
both the “compact” and “voice”  relationships are part of the “long route”). Through the 
“short route”, citizens, acting as final users/clients of the service, influence more directly 
the providers (this is the “client power” relationship).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates this accountability framework. When the policy-makers do not 
respond to the citizens, and neither them nor the final users of the services can exert 
control over the providers, service delivery is very likely to fail.  
 





















Section I: Status of the Decentralization Process in Education in LAC 
 
Latin America presents a variety of  experiences in the decentralization of education. 
Practically all countries have undertaken some form of decentralization of their education 
system which involved the transfer of decision making autonomy to actors within 
(“deconcentrated” bodies) or, more likely, outside (intermediate or local governments, 
schools, etc)  the ministry of education’s bureaucratic structure, with the main purpose of 
delivering the service more efficiently. This variety of models  are centered on different 
accountability relationships. 
 
It is very difficult to categorize all the different existing models, but, simplifying 
substantially, we can detect three main groups of  models according to the sub-national 
actors involved, the pattern adopted in the distribution of functions across sub-national 
actors and the accountability system central to the model.  These three groups of models  
are illustrated below in Figures 2, 3 and 4 (where the most important accountability   3
relationships for each model have been shadowed).  Only the most representative 
countries for each of the groups are mentioned. Some countries whose education sectors 
are still highly centralized (like Uruguay, Paraguay, Costa Rica) would not be part of any 
of these typologies, while others whose decentralization efforts are incipient would start 
falling under one of the three categories. It is worth reviewing briefly the main 
characteristics of each of the groups. 
 
A. Three Main Groups of Models  
 
Figure 2: the “sub-national government” model  
The “sub-national 
government” model 
A first type of model 
implemented in LAC, 
and illustrated in 
Figure 2, places an 
intermediate political 
actor at the center of 
the decentralization 
process. This is the 
case of Argentina 
which decentralized   
all education delivery 
functions to the 
provincial level (in 
two main stages, 1978 
and 1992), Mexico 
which did the same to 
the state level 
(gradually from 1992), Brazil where education delivery is provided by both the states and 
the municipalities, since 1930, but where the role of municipalities was increased with 
the Constitution of 1988 and, above all, the recent 1996 financing reform
3, and Chile 
which transferred service delivery to the municipal level (gradually from  1981). Brazil is 
included in this type of models because, even if there are two political actors which have 
the responsibility of education delivery, the state and the municipality, the education 
delivery systems that have developed around each of these actors are to a large extent 
independent one from another (parallel systems), also within the same state, allowing us 
to identify the working of each of them with Figure 2. 
 
A simplification is being made in putting together all these countries because it is clear 
that the decentralization processes of each of them was to a large extent different. In 
particular, some countries like Argentina and Brazil have transferred many more 
                                                 
3 In 1996, there was a particularly innovatory reform which introduced a new financing mechanism (the so-
called FUNDEF) which collects resources from state and municipal governments in a single fund and re-
distributes them to the state and municipal systems according to the amount of students enrolled in each 
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responsibilities to the sub-national level (virtually all responsibilities on the 
administration of personnel and non-personnel costs, extensive responsibilities in 
financing and some responsibilities in planning the educational process and setting-up 
curricula) than Chile and Mexico, which have maintained fairly centralized personnel and 
financing policies. In any case,  the driving force in this type of models is often the center 
(at least in the cases of  Chile and Argentina in 1978) which decentralizes the main 
responsibility for the delivery of the service to an intermediate political actor which 
becomes the center of the decentralization process and around which a specific set of 
accountability relationships needs to be built. Central to the working of this model are 
two main accountability relationships: the “compact” relationship between the center and 




In fact, the relative importance or importance tout-court of these two relationships varies 
across countries and time, becoming, as we will see, an important determinant of the 
results of the reform. In Argentina and Brazil, for instance, the “compact” relationship 
between the center and the provinces, states or municipalities  has been traditionally 
maintained very flexible, with little or no specification of national and sub-national 
responsibilities, targets and objectives (and this in spite of the two recent Education Laws 
that were approved in both countries
5) and the use of general transfers which are not tied 
to any particular efficiency indicator (this is still the case in Argentina and was the case in 
Brazil up to 1996). At least since the democratic election of the provincial governors in 
Argentina in 1983 and the one of the state governors and mayors in Brazil in, 
respectively, 1982 and 1985, both models have tended to  rely  more on the “voice” of the 
citizens inside each of the provinces, states or municipalities to produce a quality output.  
 
On the other hand, in Chile, since the beginning the responsibility for the delivery of 
education was transferred to the municipalities through specific agreements that defined 
explicitly the responsibilities, rights and obligations of the new providers and there was a 
clear attempt to reward municipal performance by tying central resources to the number 
of students attending class (implementation of a “quasi-voucher” system), while “voice” 
was only developed much later since mayors have been elected only since 1992 (11 years 
after the start of the reform). As we will see, Chile is a somewhat more complex model 
where also another accountability relationship (the “client power” one) was directly 
developed within the same “municipalization” process by  introducing a public subsidy 
also for private schools. 
 
                                                 
4 The “compact” relationship would ensure that the services are produced efficiently and in accordance 
with national objectives while the “voice” relationship would help ensure efficiency, through monitoring of 
local authorities, and the fine-tuning of the objectives to the local reality. 
5 The “Ley Federal de Educacion” in 1994 in Argentina and the “Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educacao 
Nacional” (LDB) in 1996 in Brazil. The first law was approved only about 14 years after the first wave of 
decentralization and, while it did specify the relative responsibilities of the federal government and the 
provinces in education, it did not quite provide the instruments for the center to change provincial 
behaviours. The second law, while it laid out roles and responsibilities of the various levels, assigned a 
joint responsibility in primary to the state and municipal level, which is currently open to many 
interpretations.    5





A second type of model, 
illustrated in Figure 3, 
can be well exemplified 
by the cases of Colombia 
(up to 2001/2002) and 
Bolivia. Colombia gave a 
clear impulse to the 
decentralization of 
education in 1986 by 
encouraging a 
“municipalization” 
process of service 
delivery followed by 
another clear signal in 
1991, with the new 
Constitution, giving more emphasis to regional elected levels (“departments”). Bolivia 
started its own decentralization process in 1994 and 1995, with, respectively, the 
“Popular Participation Law” (“Ley de Participacion Popular”) and the “Administrative 
Decentralization Law” (“Ley de Descentralizacion Administrativa”), which led to the 
transfer of education services to municipalities and, more gradually, to “departments”.   
 
The peculiar common feature of these models, which have generally been the product of 
more extensive country consultation (i.e. less center driven), is that they put two different 
political actors at the center of the decentralization process and distribute the main 
responsibility for service delivery among them in a complementary way
6. As the three 
levels, the central, the regional and the local, are organized hierarchically and are seen as 
having mostly a complementary role in service delivery,  this type of model, which 
should have the merit of taking advantage of the skills and specificities of each level,  is 
highly dependent on the “compact” relationship between the center and the regional 
level, on the one hand, and the regional level and the local level, on the other; as well as 
on the “voice” relationship between citizens  and the local level, on the one hand, and 
citizens and the regional level on the other.  
 
As above, the relative weight of these relationships varies between the two countries. 
Colombia, for instance, put emphasis  on all four relationships (both the departmental and 
municipal governments are elected), with particular emphasis, however, on the 
“compact” relationships. In particular, the country put in place an original accreditation 
                                                 
6 More specifically, in the case of both countries, the management of human resources was attributed 
primarily to the departmental level and the management of school infrastructure primarily to the municipal 
level, with the responsibility for the planning, pedagogical and curricular aspects of the educational process 
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process (“proceso de certificacion”) through which  the departments would be 
authorized by the center to manage all human resources and the funds that go with this 
responsibility (the so-called “Situado Fiscal”) only after they have fulfilled a number of 
pre-conditions, including the establishment of an adequate institutional setting, 
development plan and information system; and the same accreditation process was put in 
place for municipalities larger than 100,000 habitants that, under a similar set of 
conditions, could in turn be authorized by the departments to go beyond the management 
of school infrastructure and also manage directly their human resources and related 
funds. The structure of transfers put in place across levels would also tie the resources to 
several indicators, including measures of fiscal effort, in an attempt to induce efficiency 
in the use of funds.  
 
In Bolivia, particular emphasis was put on the “voice” relationship between citizens and 
the local governments: in 1994 all the local governments were elected and local 
associations (“juntas distritales”) were set up everywhere, with an important role in the 
identification of school needs and the monitoring and evaluation of the educational 
process. The role of the “compact” relationship is less clear: in particular the role of the  
departments was still not fully established in 2002.  
 





A third type of 
model, 
illustrated in 











tending in the same direction, like Honduras and Guatemala, and a state like Minas 
Gerais in Brazil would also fall under this category). In 1990, borrowing on community 
school management models developed during the civil war, El Salvador launched the 
EDUCO program, aimed at promoting a model of  school autonomy with extensive 
community participation in the rural areas. Several features of the EDUCO model would 
then be applied to traditional schools. In 1993, the Government of Nicaragua also started  
to implement a process of school autonomy with community participation (“centros 
autonomos”), which, in 1996, already covered more than 400 primary and secondary   7
schools and, in 1998, was covering 81% of the secondary school age students and almost 
half of the primary students. In both countries, “school autonomization” consisted in a 
transfer of broad administrative responsibilities (teacher management, school 
maintenance, etc) and to, a much lesser extent, some pedagogical responsibilities to 
schools. 
 
These two models started after a civil war and, therefore, were also part of a pacification 
and democratization attempt, and were initially implemented on a sub-national scale to be 
then, to different extents, extended. Their main characterizing feature is that, in contrast, 
to the other ones, they put the school at the center of the decentralization process and, 
therefore, central to their functioning are the two following accountability relationships: 
the “compact” relationship between the center and the school and the “client power” 
relationship between the service users or community and the school.  
 
In both countries, these two relationships have been substantially developed, with 
particular emphasis on the second one.  In both countries, each school is required to 
establish an elected council, composed only of  parents in EDUCO
7 and of parents, 
teachers and the school director in the “centros autonomos” 
8, and to sign a special 
agreement (or “convenio”) with the Ministry of Education which would decentralize to 
the councils the management of all funds, allowing them to manage all teachers, take care 
of  operating and maintenance costs and take academic decisions (this last aspect, in 
particular in Nicaragua). “Client power” can therefore be expressed through active 
participation in the management of the school and, additionally, in Nicaragua, also finds a 
way through the system of  National, Departmental and Local Education Councils set up 
to ensure broad participation at all levels. The “compact” relationship between the MOE 
and the school, on the other hand, is made explicit in two or three main ways: (a)  through 
the signature of  the autonomy agreement, which  specifies a number of technical 
requirements; (b) through school supervision, ensured through the establishment of a 
“deconcentrated” structure (regional and district offices of the MOE)
9  and/or 
strengthened central auditing functions; and (c) through the implementation of monthly 
transfers which include an efficiency element being allocated according to ranges of 
students enrolled. Finally, the on-going effort in the testing of student achievement, 
admittedly more advanced in El Salvador, would enhance both relationships of 
accountability.   
 
B. Complexity and Innovation in LAC Approaches to Education Delivery 
 
To conclude this section it is important to point out that this simple characterization does 
not fully make justice to the complexity, diversity and innovatory contents of the 
approaches adopted in LAC. To start with, we should highlight that the differences 
among models are not always so clear-cut. Elements of school “autonomization” are, for 
                                                 
7 The so-called “Association for Community Education” (ACE). 
8 The so-called “Local Schools Councils” (or “Consejos Directivos Escolares”) and there is also a Parent 
Council in each school which can propose changes and adjustments to the Local School Council.  
9 In the case of El Salvador, supervision is facilitated by the establishment of EDUCO central and regional 
offices with specific coordination, supervision and support tasks.   8
instance, also being increasingly applied in countries included in the first two groups of 
models. This is particularly the case of Brazil where in most states there is a current trend 
towards increased school autonomy in financial and administrative aspects and the “client 
power” relationship is increasingly used to improve education delivery through 
participatory management of schools
10. On a smaller scale, attempts to increase school 
decision-making autonomy in pedagogical matters have taken place in Chile since 1992, 
with the promotion of the Education Improvement Projects (“Proyectos de Mejoramiento 
Educativo” (PME)), and in Colombia with the “Escuela Nueva” model
11.  
 
Secondly, while we have focused our analysis of the three types of models on a few 
central accountability relationships, in each of the groups there were often innovations 
concerning other accountability relationships as well.  Innovations in the “client power” 
relationship occurred for instance in several countries, not only in the countries of the 
third group. In many cases, they were related to the development of school autonomy 
highlighted above, i.e. they were implemented through increased participation of the 
communities/users in school management; in other cases, they consisted in changes in the 
public financing of education which aimed at  empowering the users either by giving 
them the resources and allow them  to make a choice between providers (demand-side 
subsidies), or, by making provider resources highly dependent on their choice (“quasi-
vouchers”, capitation grants). While Box 1 below provides a succinct illustration of these 
types of innovations, Box 2, in the assessment section, will present a separate analysis of 
the Chilean and Colombian cases where “choice” was particularly developed within the 
decentralized education delivery system put in place, although with different objectives 
and on a different scale.  
 
Finally, in several countries there were also innovations in the “management” 
relationship (taken broadly as the relationship between the different education actors,- the 
Ministry of Education, local governments, schools, etc-, and teachers). Box 1 below 












                                                 
10 The most well known case is the one of Minas Gerais since the early 1990s where enhanced school 
autonomy in the administrative, financing and pedagogical areas was accompanied by a major 
democratization of school administration (through the establishment of elected school councils, or 
“colegiado escolar”) and the establishment of a public school assessment program aimed at measuring 
school performance in a transparent and systematic way. 
11 Applied in the rural sector, it is a model where teachers have much greater flexibility in making their own 
decisions regarding the education process and parents fully participate in school activities.   9




Demand-side financing programs include a variety of mechanisms which go from  conditional 
cash transfer programs, which provide cash on the condition that families send their children to 
school (“Progresa” in Mexico and “Bolsa Escola” in Brazil are probably the most well known 
example to date) to targeted vouchers which provide a cash payment to families to be used at a 
school of their choice, allowing generally for enrollment in public or private schools (see 
secondary education targeted voucher program introduced in Colombia in 1992). Beyond the 
potential impact of  targeted vouchers on the enrollment of  children, and, particularly, poor 
children,  by providing “choice” to the final users of the education service (and by the same token 
a possibility of “exit” from inefficient schools), this financing mechanism should also help 
establish a clear accountability line between clients and schools which should lead schools to be 
more responsive to client needs.  
 
Capitation Grants 
Of particular relevance to decentralization have been the attempts of setting up “quasi-voucher” 
(or capitation grant) systems which, by allocating resources to the providers according to the 
students enrolled,  make them dependent on client choice and therefore promote competition 
among them for attracting and retaining students. In the LAC case, this financing mechanism has 
been introduced in Chile, where its also applies to private schools, applied to some extent to some 
Central American countries, but also more recently introduced in Brazil with the 1996 FUNDEF 
reform and, even more recently, in Colombia with the 2001 reform. In general, this financing 
mechanism has mostly involved the regional or local levels of provision, i.e. these levels receive 
the subsidy and not the school, increasing “client power” more indirectly or modifying the 
“voice” relationship at the local/regional level  by also allowing an “exit” possibility at this level 
(in other words, this works like a “vote with your feet” type of mechanism  at the local/regional 




Within the “management” relationship, countries in Latin America differ in their policies for 
teacher hiring, assignment to schools, promotion, and firing. Countries also differ in their 
compensation structures and whether they include incentives for teachers to take on additional 
responsibilities, to acquire stronger skills, and/or to work in schools serving disadvantaged 
children.  Further, countries vary in the extent to which they support the provision of education by 
the private sector, where teacher hiring, firing, and compensation decisions are usually made at 
the school level. The incentives embedded in these different policies can influence the quality of 
teacher entrants and their decision to stay in the profession.  
 
Several countries in the region have recently implemented policy reforms that significantly affect 
the teaching profession. Some examples are: Mexico’s Carrera Magisterial program, which 
entails individual-based monetary rewards for teachers based on measured performance; Chile’s 
SNED (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño), which consists of school-based 
monetary rewards to be distributed among the school staffs; and Brazil’s FUNDEF, which creates 
a floor for expenditures per student, and the accompanying requirement for teachers to be 
certified.    
                                                 
12 A detailed description of demand-side financing mechanisms in Latin America if provided  by Patrinos, 
H (2002): “A Review of Demand-Side Financing Initiatives in Education”, Background Paper for the WDR 
2003. 
13 Paragraph written by E. Vegas.    10
Section II: Assessment and Main Lessons 
 
A. Summary of the Assessment 
 
Assessing the impact of decentralization reforms on the efficiency, quality, coverage or 
equity of education delivery is a difficult task for a number of reasons. Firstly, these are 
typically complex reforms which, as we have seen, can be designed very differently and 
be based on different accountability relationships: this makes it particularly difficult to 
assess their effects. Secondly, in most cases in Latin America (with the noticeable 
exceptions of Central American countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador),  the reforms 
were implemented nation-wide making it difficult to establish a counter-factual since we 
do not have a control group. In that case, the only available options for attempting to 
disentangle the effects of decentralization from the effects of other reforms will usually 
be a simple before/after comparison without a control group or a before/after comparison 
using the fact that decentralization, even if eventually nation-wide, did not involve all 
geographic areas and/or schools at the same pace. If even these options are not available, 
measures of variability in the intensity of decentralization, by type and number of 
functions decentralized to the sub-national units, could still be attempted to capture  some 
type of impact on outcome indicators. Finally, the lack of reliable data will also simply 
lead to much simpler evaluations centered  on the analysis of intermediate indicators of 
efficiency, quality or poverty and/or based on much simpler evaluations methodologies.  
Thirdly, most of the reforms were started for reasons exogenous to the education sector 
(fiscal or macroeconomic reasons, broad efficiency objectives, democratization, etc) and, 
as such, made any subsequent assessment of the impact of the reform on educational 
outcomes in any case difficult because no attention was paid from the outset to baselines, 
identification of possible control groups and information and monitoring systems which 
would help assess the impact of reforms in time (no “built-in” evaluation mechanisms).  
 
As more systematic and rigorous information on educational outcomes became available 
(in particular, all countries in LAC have now introduced some form of standardized 
testing, either on a national or sample basis), the quality of the assessments improved in 
time. Still, however, for the above mentioned reasons, there are very few thorough 
evaluations on the impact of decentralization on the quality, coverage, equity of 
education of  the first two groups of models; while, on average, more formal evaluations 
have been undertaken, often as a World Bank’s initiative, of the  “school 
autonomization” models. For this type of models, evaluations were upfront made more 
pertinent and easier by the fact that  most experiences of  “school autonomization” were 
implemented with specific educational objectives in mind (increase in coverage, 
educational quality or efficiency improvements, etc), beyond other more general 
objectives (such as democratization, political motivations, etc).  
 
Overall, a number of more or less formal  assessments of several countries’ 
decentralization experiences was put together and allowed us to find some evidence on 
the impact of  each group of models on the quality, coverage and equity of provision, 
with emphasis, when possible, on the performance of the poor.  Annex I presents an 
assessment of the studies per group of models and country, which points to the key role   11
of  the accountability mechanisms put in place and highlights some other possible factors 
in determining the achievements of the reforms. Table 1, below, summarizes this 
evidence, which makes it possible to extract some lessons on the accountability side and 
the possible advantages/disadvantages of the different models. In Box, 2, which follows 
Table 1, we also present a special assessment of the Chilean and Colombian cases along 
the “client power/choice” dimension to see if we can extract some lessons on the 
application of this particular accountability mechanism. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Assessments  
Models:  Summary of findings with interpretation  
“Sub-national government” model 
Argentina 
(Carciofi, Cetrangolo and 
Larranaga, 1996) 
(Galiani and Schardrodosky, 
2002) 
In the absence of a clear “compact” between the Ministry of Education 
and the provinces, which was only slightly strengthened with the 
approval of the “Ley Federal de Educacion” in 1993, the effects of 
decentralization on the quality and coverage of education are found to 
vary a lot across provinces depending on provincial management. 
Quality, as measured by test scores, is shown to improve after the 1992 
negotiated decentralization reform, possibly for a more effective use of  
“voice”. 
Chile 
(Carciofi, Cetrangolo and 
Larranaga, 1996, McEwan and 
Carnoy, 1999a, Gauri, 1996, 
Espinola, 1994, Schiefelbein, 
1992, 2000, Cox and Gonzalez, 
1998, Rounds, 1997, Hsieh and 
Urquiola, 2002,  Sapelli and Vial, 
2002, Gallego, 2002)  
 
The available evidence generally suggests that overall enrolment and 
quality (admittedly difficult to measure in the 1980s because of the 
absence of comparable test scores) did not improve over the 1980s (and 
divergence among schools increased), largely because of the poor 
results of the municipal sector. These poor results were  mostly due to a 
gap between   responsibility and authority to act, the presence of soft 
budget constraints for the operation of the municipal education sector, 
the lack of  citizen participation mechanisms at the local level and the 
“missed opportunity” of exploiting the  potential of the “client power” 
relationship as instrument to improve competition between public and 
private schools (see Box 2). Overall, the enrolment rate improves 
during the 1990s, average test scores improve  for all school categories 
and there is increasing convergence among all these school categories, 
following the application of  some competition-enhancing measures 
(although not all measures were consistent with competition-see Box 
2), as well as “voice” and quality-enhancing measures (including new 
teachers’ incentives mechanisms).  
Brazil 
(World Bank, 2003) 
The lack of a clear compact mechanism between the center and the 
states/municipalities is shown to have led to a variety of  experiences 
with different outcomes. Educational achievement outcomes and 
enrollment [in particular in poor areas] have substantially improved 
after the 1996 FUNDEF reform, largely due to an effective use of the 
“compact”, within a framework of extensive authority decentralized to 
states and municipalities, and to an effective use of teacher 
management. Spending efficiency varies, however, among 
municipalities depending on local skills and the working of “voice”. 
“Sub-national shared responsibility” model 
Colombia 
(Gomez and Vargas, 1997)  
(Borjas and Acosta, 2000) 
Poor implementation of the compact relationship and the same shared 
nature of  responsibilities for the provision of the services hampered the 
effectiveness of the decentralization process in Colombia. In spite of 
increasing spending, enrollment and its distribution across socio-
economic classes stagnated during the 1990s. Reform changed with 
2001 law following a “learning by doing” type of process: a full 
“municipalization” model will prevail.    12
Bolivia 
(Ruiz and Giussani, 1997) 
(Faguet, 2000) 
The shared responsibility model led municipalities to over-invest and 
the role of the departments is still unclear. However, following the 
decentralization reform, investment in education became more 
progressively distributed [favoured poor areas] and more responsive to 
local needs, due an effective use of “voice”.   “Voice” effectiveness 
varies across municipalities. 
“School autonomization” model 
Nicaragua and El Salvador 
(King and Ozler, 1998) 
(Jimenez and Sawada, 1998; 
Sawada and Ragatz, 2004) 
In Nicaragua, school-based decisions on teacher management are 
shown to have a positive impact on test scores.  In El Salvador, 
enrollment in the rural areas increased massively  following EDUCO. It 
is also shown that school-based decisions  on teacher management have 
a positive impact on class attendance and even, according to the most 
recent assessment, educational achievement. In both models, these 
positive results are the product of a well designed and effectively 
implemented “client power” relationship
14, accompanied by a solid 
“compact”.   
Other cases 
(Argentina: Eskeland and Filmer, 
2002)  
(Brazil: Paes de Barros and 
Mendonca, 1998) 
(Chile: Di Gropello, 2002) 
(Honduras: Di Gropello and 
Marshall, 2004) 
Other evidence suggests that school autonomy in several areas 
(financing and/or administrative and/or pedagogical, etc) increases test 
scores and other educational achievement indicators and that the impact 
of autonomy is strengthened by the use of “client power”. It is also 
shown in some of the studies that “client power” only has an impact 
combined with school autonomy . Finally, school autonomy, or 
increased school decision-making in local decisions, can promote 
convergence among rich and poor schools and its impact is likely to 
depend on surrounding institutional characteristics.  
Source: Annex I. 
 
Box 2: Decentralization to the sub-national level and “choice”: an assessment of the 
Chilean and Colombian cases 
Colombia introduced in 1992 a secondary education targeted  voucher program which, in 1996, 
involved more than one-fifth of the municipalities and close to 2,000 private schools with the 
main objective of increasing the transition from primary to secondary education for poor students. 
Participation of municipalities and private schools in the voucher program was voluntary. Chile, 
while decentralizing the management of schools to municipalities, also introduced, in 1981, a 
system of “quasi-vouchers” directed to all municipal schools and non-fee-charging private 
schools, with the main objective of  promoting competition among schools to lead to higher 
quality and enrollment. We provide below an assessment of these two cases based on the existing 
empirical evidence. 
 
Chile (Carciofi, Cetrangolo and Larranaga, 1996, Gauri, 1996, Espinola, 1994, Schiefelbein, 
2000, McEwan and Carnoy, 1999a,b, Rounds, 1997, Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002, Sapelli and Vial, 
2002,  Gallego, 2002 and Di Gropello, 2002):  
 
During the 1980s, following the introduction of the per-student subsidy, enrolment increased 
considerably in the private voucher schools (from 14% in 1980 to 32% in 1990) and, controlling 
for socio-economic status, private subsidized schools seem to perform better than municipal 
schools (Carciofi, Cetrangolo and Larranaga, 1996, Carnoy and McEwan, 1999b), pointing to 
positive effects of  competition on private schools’ performance. However, it is generally 
recognized in the studies that are largely centred on the 1980s period (Carciofi, Cetrangolo and 
                                                 
14 Although this is somewhat less true in Nicaragua where directors are often said to have too much power 
within the school councils.    13
Larranaga, 1996, Carnoy and McEwan, 1999a and Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002) that competition 
among private and municipal schools was hampered by the lack of incentives and capacity of the 
municipal sector to compete (existence of soft budget constraints at the municipal level, 
restrictions on municipal decision-making and lack of autonomy and accountability of municipal 
schools), lack of clear information on relative school performance, and some “cream-skimming” 
(advantaged and more able students migrate to private schools thanks to informational advantages 
and private schools select students).  
 
In the 1990s, on the one hand, further constraints on municipal autonomy (teacher statute of 
1991) and centrally driven interventions in favour of  the poorest/weakest municipal schools  
complicate even more the working of competition between municipal and private schools (see Di 
Gropello (2002) for the negative impact of the teacher statute and Sapelli and Vial (2002) for the 
negative impact of central interventions on competition through the implied differences in per-
capita budget between the two types of schools); on the other hand, dissemination of standardized 
school scores (SIMCE scores), increased administrative and pedagogical municipal school 
autonomy, introduction of school co-financing and improved monitoring of student attendance 
improve the operation of the voucher system.  
 
The studies centred on the 1990s  generally confirm that private subsidized schools perform better 
than municipal schools (see Sapelli and Vial, 2002) and have improved their performance due to  
strong incentives to compete (decision-making autonomy, reliance on the voucher or parent co-
financing, etc), therefore concluding that competition/choice was helpful in improving the quality 
and efficiency of schools (Gallego, 2002). However, the impact of competition on the 
performance of municipal schools remains more controversial, with some studies (see Gallego, 
2002) finding  that the improved municipal performance was largely due to competition 
(hampered by compensatory programs but enhanced by other measures-see above), while others 
that it was due to the central compensatory programs. 
 
Colombia (King and others, 1997, 1999 and Angrist and others, 2002a,b): 
 
The available empirical evidence (King and others, 1997, 1999 and Angrist and others, 20002a,b) 
suggests that, in the 20% participating municipalities, the program provided an effective way of 
increasing educational attainment and achievement (college-entrance test scores) for the poor 
students benefiting from the vouchers (with some evidence of higher achievement, as measured 
by test scores,  among voucher recipients).  Among the key factors for this success we can 
mention: (a) the sound criteria in the selection of the participating municipalities, such as the 
limited public school capacity and important private sector excess capacity; (b) the participation 
of private schools with educational quality comparable to public schools; and (c) the effective 
targeting of vouchers to poor communities, with  the introduction of performance incentives for 
the participating beneficiaries. Political economy considerations (lack of government’s 
commitment, teacher union’s opposition) and administrative difficulties (delays in  
disbursements, burden of program monitoring) led to the discontinuation of the program at the 
federal level in 1997, which, however, continued in several municipalities up to this day, financed 
through municipal funds. 
 
B. Main Lessons and Challenges Ahead  
 
Some determinants of the success or failure of each group of models 
The assessments presented in Table 1 show that the single most important factor in 
ensuring the success or failure of a reform is the way the accountability relationships are   14
set to work within each of the models. At least one “core” set of accountability 
relationships should work well in each of the models (e.g., “compact(s)” or “voice(s)” in 
the first and second groups of models, and “client power” or “compact” in the third 
group) and it is even better if all “core” relationships work well, in a complementary way. 
For example, cases like Nicaragua and El Salvador appear to have had some positive 
achievements because all accountability relationships were given the right importance 
and effectively used, and this also appears to have been the case with the 1996 reform in 
Brazil; in Argentina, on the other hand, too little weight was given to the “compact” 
relationship in a framework were “voice” was not always satisfactory, and, in Chile, too 
little emphasis was put on “voice” and low authority hampered the “compact”.    
 
This result  is not surprising. Going back to the principal-agent model, the agent, or sub-
national level, once given decision-making autonomy will often have the temptation to 
use it opportunistically, i.e. putting its own interests (or the particularized interests of a local 
elite) before the achievement of the national objective for which decentralization was 
undertaken in the first place (i.e. improving student learning).  In this scenario, mechanisms 
will need to be found to have the agent acting in the national interest and, typically, these 
mechanisms will consist of interventions aimed at establishing clear lines of accountability 
between the central level and the agent (compact) and/or clear lines of accountability 
between the agent and the community (voice and/or client power). These different lines of 
accountability will generally have the capacity of complementing each other (for instance, 
when it comes to monitoring education delivery, local residents or school users will often be 
able to monitor the attendance of teachers to classes, while the centre will be more likely to 
have the tools and knowledge to monitor general academic standards). In the absence of any 
working accountability line, it is unlikely that decentralization will lead to any positive 
result.  
 
How to get accountability relationships working effectively within each of the models 
becomes then the key question. This is difficult to establish, but a number of lessons can  
be extracted  from our case studies:  
 
(a) there needs to be a certain level of consistency between the model selected  and the 
relationships of accountability on which the emphasis is put: in Chile, the achievements 
of the reform were hampered by the fact that the special emphasis put on the “client 
power/choice” relationship was not accompanied by measures to increase autonomy and 
accountability of municipal schools (too protected from competition), while, at the same 
time, the “municipalization” model was developed with no focus on the “voice” 
relationship; 
 
(b) there needs to be real transfer of authority to the sub-national units: the gap 
between responsibility and authority to act hampered the good functioning of all 
accountability relationships in Chile and some existing evidence suggests that the same is 
also valid for Mexico. In both countries, centralized teacher management practices 
represent the stronger management constraint for the sub-national level; 
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(c) consensual reforms are more likely to be conducive to strong “voice” and/or “client 
power” relationships (in a positive sense, this is illustrated by the 1992 
“provincialization” in Argentina and the “municipalization” process in Bolivia) and to a 
sustainable transfer of authority necessary for the good working of all the relationships 
(in Chile, the creation of a broader-based consensus on the reform in the 1980s would 
have probably avoided the partial reversal of the reform in 1991 with the approval of a 
very rigid teacher statute); 
 
(d) how to design and implement effective “compact” relationships. This is a particularly 
difficult challenge because, going back to the principal-agent model, there will typically 
be significant information asymmetries between the center and the agent (i.e. the effort 
and ability of the agent is unobserved) which will complicate the design and 
implementation of contracts between the parts. There are no clear-cut solutions to this 
challenge which has been widely debated in the literature.  Our case studies do not 
probably provide “best practices” in this area, but allow us to identify practices that 
work/are necessary to develop  effective accountability lines between the center and the 
agent, divided in two main groups: 
 
•  Practices aimed at inducing efficient and equitable behaviors: 
(i)  clear definition of all actors’ responsibilities, through well-designed legal 
and/or administrative instruments (Education Laws, Transfer Agreements, 
etc): Chile and Nicaragua have been successful in defining relative 
responsibilities through administrative transfer agreements, while Colombia, 
where responsibilities became quickly blurred across actors, recently 
introduced a comprehensive Education Law which establishes quite clearly 
relative responsibilities; 
 
(ii)  use of simple fund allocation formulae, such as per-student fund allocations 
(capitation grants): Chile and Brazil have been successful in applying this 
fund allocation mechanism, which is particularly useful to increase 
enrollment, Colombia will adopt it after the failure of its overly complicated 
formulae; 
 
(iii)  use of hard budget constraints for local governments (and schools): the 
efficiency of the municipal sector and its capacity of competing against the 
private sector was weakened by the existence of soft budget constraints for 
municipalities (and schools) in Chile; soft budget constraints for 
municipalities also encouraged Colombian municipalities to hire teachers and 
run deficits; the importance of sound local fiscal behaviour is also confirmed 
by the recent evidence on Argentina (the positive impact of decentralization 
on test outcomes decreases as the provincial deficit increases);   
 
(iv)  use of per-capita spending targets instead than formulae attempting to measure 
basic needs, poverty, etc, indicators too subject to “adverse selection” 
problems: Brazil obtained equitable results by fixing national floors in per   16
student educational spending, while Colombia did not using complicated 
equity-adjusted formulae.  
 
•  Practices aimed at improving information: 
(i) development  of  monitoring/supervisory systems through: (a) the strengthening 
of central auditing functions, including the capacity of keeping track of public 
resources: Nicaragua, for instance, added a new central department in the 
Ministry of Education, whose main function was the one of auditing the 
finance and handle the fiscal administration of the new  decentralized system; 
while Mexico failed to really improve central auditing practices; and (b) the 
effective use and/or establishment of a regional deconcentrated monitoring 
structure, such as in Chile with the role of provinces in the monitoring of 
student attendance or in El Salvador with the establishment of  EDUCO 
central and regional offices with specific coordination, supervision and 
support tasks; 
 
(ii)  development of evaluation systems through the introduction and 
systematization of standardized testing: Chile was, for instance, successful in 
introducing at the end of the 1980s a national standardized testing system, 
called SIMCE, which allowed the government and all other actors involved in 
education (teachers, parents, etc) to have objective information on municipal 
and school performance; most other countries have by now introduced some 
form of standardized testing, although not necessarily on a national scale. 
  
 
(e) how to implement effective “voice” relationships. In a setting where asymmetries of 
information between the centre and the sub-national level are pervasive, the role of the 
community (either through the long route to accountability, i.e. voice, or through the 
short route, i.e. client power) will be all the more important to help providing the 
incentives for effective service delivery. Our case studies indicate that to create an 
effective accountability relationship between the community and the sub-national 
government, a first necessary step will be the organization of  local/regional elections: in 
all countries, these elections were, at least to some extent, used as a tool to express 
preferences on education (which does not necessarily happen in national elections, 
dominated by other topics). To provide more strength and continuity in this 
accountability relationship, the cases studies also show, however, that the establishment 
of  well-functioning and truly representative civic organizations with extended reporting 
and monitoring responsibilities will be necessary: in Bolivia, for instance, special 
oversight committees were created in all municipalities to  oversee municipal spending 
and propose new projects with, on average, satisfactory results; while in Brazil, the 
establishment of local social councils led to rational/ efficient behavior in several 
municipalities. Still, regarding civic organization, our evidence also shows that, although 
these arrangements might coordinate and convey voice effectively, often they lack the 
means of enforcing change, raising an issue of “voice” effectiveness. 
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(f) how to implement effective “client power” relationships based on a “choice” strategy. 
How choice between providers can lead to better educational outcomes is another widely 
debated issue, to which we can only provide some partial response based on Chile and 
Colombia. We can  make the following points (based on the evidence presented in Box 
2): 
(i)  Applying a national voucher system with the aim of promoting 
competition among schools will generally require different  pre-conditions 
(and generally more stringent) that a system of targeted vouchers aimed at 
sending low income students to private schools; 
 
(ii)  Conditions on the supply-side for the national voucher system include the 
need to ensure that (a) all schools have the incentive and capacity to 
compete: significant levels of school decision-making autonomy and hard 
budget constraints will be important elements here; and (b) all schools 
report thoroughly their student enrollment: effective monitoring systems 
will be important here;    
 
(iii)  Conditions on the demand-side for the national voucher scheme include 
the need to ensure that (a) all final beneficiaries of the services have 
information on relative school performance: introduction of standardized 
testing and publication of the schools’ results  is an important element 
here; and (b) students are free to move among schools: regulation of   
schools’ selections practices would be useful here; 
 
(iv)  Conditions on the supply-side for the targeted voucher scheme include the 
need for substantial private sector excess capacity  and participation of 
private schools with educational quality at least comparable to the one of  
public schools; 
  
(v)  Conditions on the demand-side for the targeted voucher scheme include  
the need for effective targeting of the vouchers to poor communities, 
effective mobility of students across the participating schools, and 
effective monitoring of student attendance and performance; 
 
(vi)   Conditions common to these two schemes will include the establishment 
of effective systems to monitor student attendance and regulate schools’ 
student selection practices. 
 
 
(g) how to implement effective “client power” relationships based on a  strategy of parent 
participation. Our case studies show that this accountability relationship will be 
strengthened by the introduction of elected school councils with  substantial 
responsibilities in service delivery (responsibilities in the hiring, firing and monitoring of 
teachers will be particularly important), also implying substantial school decision-making 
autonomy: Nicaragua and El Salvador were both successful in empowering parents 
through the creation of generally well functioning elected school councils.  
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Is there a model better than another ? What are the common challenges ? 
Our analysis also allows us to go beyond the analysis of each group of models to make 
some comparisons across groups and countries and detect more general challenges and 
future directions in selecting “successful” models. Five main points can be made here.  
 
•  Avoiding complicated models: The experiences of Colombia and, to a minor 
extent, Bolivia seem to indicate that  the second group of models, involving more 
than one political sub-national actor in service delivery with complementary 
functions,  makes the creation of an effective accountability system particularly 
difficult. The difficulty of this challenge might advise for a simpler delivery 
model (and this is the trend currently pursued by the Colombian reform); 
 
•  Increasing school autonomy and the scope for “client power”:   Several case 
studies that we have reviewed indicate a positive impact of school decision-
making autonomy in some areas on the quality and even equity of education. This 
seems to suggest that decentralizing responsibilities to the school in some areas, 
and particularly in the teacher management area, makes it possible to maximize 
the use of local information and accountability mechanisms. It seems that in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, for instance, decentralized teacher management was 
made particularly effective by parents’ enhanced control on teachers, that is by 
the expression of “client power”. Does, therefore, the relative success of school 
autonomy suggest that an education delivery model which enhances the “client 
power” relationship is more likely to succeed that models which emphasize 
“voice” (such as the sub-national government models) and/or “compact” ? This is 
an interesting question to which it is difficult to give a reply. It is likely that, given 
the peculiarities of the educational process (proximity to the final users, continuity 
in the provision of the service, limited teachers’ informational advantages), the 
scope for user participation is particularly important in education and needs to be 
fully exploited. This does not mean that “client power” alone is sufficient to 
ensure that all the benefits of decentralization materialize: a solid “compact” will 
also be needed to ensure the fulfillment of coverage, efficiency and equity targets 
(in Nicaragua and El Salvador, for instance, parents have been particularly 
effective in monitoring teacher behavior and the allocation of school funds, 
ensuring the achievement of efficiency and quality targets, but it is the Ministry of 
Education that, through its financial transfers tied to the number of students and 
continuous monitoring, ensures minimum levels of coverage, equity and 
efficiency). Similarly, “voice”, i.e. the so-called  “long route” of accountability, 
still has a role to play insofar as local communities through their influence on 
national and/or sub-national governments will have, at a minimum, an impact on 
the establishment of the overall legislative, administrative and financial 
framework of education delivery.  To sum up, within an education delivery 
model, there seems to be ground for maximizing the scope for “client power” 
through an increase in school decision making autonomy, at least in certain 
areas, without, however,  losing the contribution that can be given by the 
other accountability relationships.    19
 
In practice, what this conclusion implies for the models  of the first two groups, 
where intermediate political actors are the main actors responsible for the 
delivery, is that these models need to increase the role of schools as decision 
making actors. As we have seen above, this is essentially happening in most Latin 
American countries. This new trend introduces new challenges in these models. 
Should the school directly be put at the center of the delivery model (like in the 
“school autonomization” model) and all other actors, which have an established 
institutional history in the country, be simply used as “support” actors with a 
monitoring/supervisory role ? Or should these actors still have a number of 
responsibilities, for instance in infrastructure and teacher management, and, 
therefore, an efficient way of sharing responsibilities across multiple actors 
should be found ? This second type of model would have the advantage of 
exploiting all accountability relationships (since, for an issue of size, “voice” will 
be more effective at the sub-national than at the national level), but might be 
difficult to manage for the reasons highlighted above (see “avoiding complicated 
models”). This challenge is or will be  particularly difficult for non federal 
countries like Chile, Colombia and Bolivia, which are trying, to different extents, 
to increase school autonomy in the context of systems where the MOE still has a 
lot of authority and the sub-national governments are generally middle sized, with 
the consequence of having three or even four levels of delivery. Essentially, 
more evidence would be needed on the type of institutional setting that would 
create the best environment for increased school autonomy in the countries 
where schools have not been at the center of the process up to now (i.e. 
countries of the first two groups).  
 
•  Putting more emphasis on the “management” accountability relationship and 
sustainability issues: as countries increase school autonomy there will also be 
more scope for acting on the “management” relationship, which is essential given 
that  teachers are the most crucial actor in the educational process and improving 
teachers’ incentives to provide quality education should therefore be part of each 
reform attempt. In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, for instance, teachers’ 
incentives to perform effectively have been enhanced through higher school 
decision-making and higher parental participation (and in fact, the focus on 
teacher management can partly explain the effectiveness of these decentralization 
reforms). An improvement of teachers’ incentives, if we see that as the ultimate 
objective, could, however, also take place through the implementation of other 
decentralization models (this is the case of Brazil, for instance, where the 
FUNDEF reform was accompanied by the explicit target of improving the 
salaries, qualifications, career prospects and performance of teachers, in particular 
in the municipal system) or even separately from decentralization (this is the case 
of Chile where  the school-based monetary rewards to be distributed to teachers 
are decided by the center), illustrating cases of improved teacher management 
which do not necessarily involve decisions at the school level. In any case, the 
empirical evidence shows that the “management” accountability relationship, 
interpreted in a broader sense to include all cases of improved teacher   20
management,  needs to be given  special  emphasis in education delivery 
models.   
 
This is all the more important giving the strength of teacher unions in Latin 
America. Teacher unions can be said to constitute another main component of 
each of the models, with their own relationships towards each of the main actors 
of the models (the national and sub-national governments, schools, etc). As 
decentralized teacher management to the sub-national or school level is generally 
part of a decentralization reform, teachers unions are directly concerned about the 
reform. There is hardly any empirical evidence on how teacher unions’ behavior 
influenced the outcomes of the reforms, what is sure, though, is that, in some 
cases, because of their disagreement, reforms were either blocked (case of Mexico 
during several years), made less extensive or partially reversed (case of Chile with 
the approval of the rigid 1991 Teacher Statute). There were also other cases, like 
the Central American ones, where  rigid teacher statutes were simply 
circumvented by establishing a parallel teacher hiring and firing system at the 
school level (i.e. leading schools to manage teachers outside the limitations 
imposed by the teacher statute). In all cases, the same sustainability of the reform 
is at stake. Essentially, teacher unions are often worried that decentralization will 
mean losing a number of privileges associated with the teacher profession (open-
ended employment status, etc) and, therefore, will often be opposed to the 
reforms. In this scenario, instead of excluding them from any debate and decision,  
measures will need to be found to bring them on board. Compensating the 
possible lost privileges on the type of appointment by special pecuniary rewards 
and new possibilities of professional development, through well-designed 
teachers’ incentive policies, could be a way to go, explaining why good teacher 
management policies are so important (the dialogue with teacher unions improved 
in both Chile and Mexico after the introduction of the recent teachers’ incentives 
mechanisms). On another scale, countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua have 
managed to attract teachers in the autonomous schools through a policy of high 
salaries and other benefits (in contrast to Honduras): the parallel teacher system 
still exists, however,  raising a persistent sustainability issue.    
 
  
•  Learning from the “best performers” within the country: We should also add 
that there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the performance of  the 
education delivery model within the same country.  In other words, the same 
delivery model can be producing different outcomes depending on the state, 
province, municipality of the country. This suggests that, in some cases, before 
trying to modify the model (or as we modify it), it would be worth trying to 
improve our understanding of why some sub-national  governments do better than 
others and find effective ways of sharing these “good practices”. It is likely that 
the main determinants of  performance at the local level are similar to the ones we 
have already established  and, therefore, that the good functioning of the 
accountability mechanisms be essential. The cases of Brazil and Bolivia, where 
the good functioning of the social councils and monitoring committees effectively   21
empowered the local communities in some municipalities making a substantial 
difference at the local level, illustrates this point. There might, however, be other 
factors specifically related to local management practices which explain the 
differential in performance. As suggested by the current delivery model in 
Argentina and the school autonomy experiences in Brazil, different institutional, 
fiscal and political characteristics of each state or province might produce 
different results in different parts of the country. An important challenge ahead 
would be the one of detecting the “best performers”, establish why they are 
“best performers” and find ways to move the sub-national governments 
whose performance is not as good to learn from these “best performers”.  
 
•  “Learning from other countries” or “learning by doing”: Finally, identifying the 
“right” model and institutional set-up for each country is not an easy task and the 
main issue here is how to proceed to make this happen. A first way of proceeding 
would be through an effective sharing of  international experiences in 
decentralization reforms, so as to “learn from the mistakes” of other countries and 
avoid wasting time and funds in badly designed reforms. Along this line, Bolivia 
might have a possibility now to learn from Colombia and instead of deepening the 
“shared responsibility” model, skip that stage and go for a straight 
“municipalization” one. This is a useful path which, however, needs to be taken 
with care to avoid comparisons among very different countries.  
 
Another way of proceeding is simply by “learning by doing”. In fact, this is what 
most of the countries of the region have done (see Chile, Colombia, etc) and this 
raises the  question of how  “learning by doing” can be most effectively 
implemented so that it can consolidate or change the direction of a reform when 
necessary. Do we need to set in place precise  evaluation strategies from the 
beginning of the reforms which  allow us to measure the progress of the reform in 
time, or simply be sure that a good enough monitoring system is in place to make 
ex-post assessments possible ? The first methodology was applied in Nicaragua, 
through the evaluation strategy of the “centros autonomos”  put in place in 1995, 
while the second one in El Salvador, through the practice of publishing ex-post 
assessments of the year (“Informes Anuales de Labor”), and Chile, through the 
nation-wide implementation of standardized testing which gave rise to several ex-
post assessments of the 1980’s reform. Following the ex-post assessments, in El 
Salvador it was decided to extend somewhat the EDUCO model to traditional 
schools and in Chile to gradually modify the decentralization model. Overall, 
another challenge ahead is the design of  strategies which would make it 
possible to maximize the impact of “learning from others” and “learning by 
doing” (for instance, an issue here is how to design a “learning by doing” strategy 
not too costly but which can provide timely feed-back).  
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ANNEX  I. CASE STUDIES  
 




In the absence of a clear “compact” between the Ministry of Education and the 
provinces, which was only slightly strengthened with the approval of the “Ley 
Federal de Educacion” in 1993, the effects of decentralization on the quality and 
coverage of education are found to vary a lot across provinces depending on 
provincial management. Quality, as measured by test scores, is shown to improve 
after the 1992 negotiated decentralization reform, possibly for a more effective use 
of  “voice”. 
 
Evidence: 
An informal, mostly descriptive, assessment carried out by Carciofi, Cetrangolo and Larranaga in 
1996 shows that following the 1978 first decentralization process, while all provinces increased 
expenditure in education and the overall national primary enrollment rate increased, the size of 
the increase and the allocation of that increase across alternative uses (hiring of new teachers, 
salary increases, new investments, etc), as well as the evolution of the primary enrollment rate, 
varied substantially across provinces depending on indicators of fiscal solvency, other provincial 
constraints (like the weight the trade unions) and specific provincial educational choices. 
Similarly, a formal evaluation (Galiani and Schardrodosky, 2002) of the 1992 process of 
secondary education decentralization to the provincial level
15,  finds overall significant positive 
effects of  the “provincialization” of education on the quality of education measured by 
standardized test scores
16  but that this impact depends significantly on the provincial fiscal result, 
as measured by the provincial fiscal deficit/surplus (i.e. the positive impact of decentralization on 
test outcomes decreases as the provincial deficit increases). The two papers also indicate that the 
“voice” accountability mechanism as control over local politicians or local participation in 
education management does not seem to have played a major role in the achievement of certain 
educational outcomes, largely because of the sizes of the provinces
17. However, above all in the 
negotiated/consensual 1992 reform, it is also shown that there was still at work a “voice through 
vote” mechanism which is likely to have led voters to concentrate on education issues at the 
                                                 
15 This study exploited the fact that decentralization took place gradually between 1992 and 1994 and 
therefore induced an exogenous variation in the administration of secondary schools across units and time 
to assess the impact of decentralization on test scores  using a difference-in-difference estimator (two-way 
fixed effect error component model). More specifically, the identification strategy exploits the fact that the 
exposure to education decentralization of a final year secondary school student varies both by province and 
student cohort (i.e. it also assumes that test scores are correlated to the number of years that a student 
spends under one or the other administration regime). The model also controls for the possibility that 
unobservable factors cause the evolution of test outcomes to differ across provinces, thereby violating the 
common time effects assumption, by  estimating a difference-in-difference of the difference of public and 
private test outcomes and for the existence of heterogeneous impact of decentralization on test outcomes 
through interactions between the decentralization variable and other covariates. 
16 The paper finds that, on average, between 1994 and 1998, test outcomes of public schools improved 1.2 
standard deviations of its distribution as a result of the decentralization process.  
17 In Galiani and Schardrodosky, 2002, this is shown by the fact that the interaction between provincial size 
and the decentralization variable is not significant which can simply be interpreted as an indication that at a 
large size, size does not really matter anymore.   23
provincial level  and, say, macroeconomics at the national level
18, explaining the incentive to 





The available evidence generally suggests that overall enrolment and quality 
(admittedly difficult to measure in the 1980s because of the absence of comparable 
test scores) did not improve over the 1980s (and divergence among schools 
increased), largely because of the poor results of the municipal sector. These poor 
results were  mostly due a gap between   responsibility and authority to act, the 
presence of soft budget constraints for the operation of the municipal education 
sector, the lack of  citizen participation mechanisms at the local level and the 
“missed opportunity” of exploiting the  potential of the “client power” relationship 
as instrument to improve competition between public and private schools.  
Overall, enrolment rates improve during the 1990s, average test scores improve for 
all school categories and there is increasing convergence between all these school 
categories (i.e. municipal vs. private, subsidized or not, and private subsidized vs. 
private schools), following the application of competition, “voice” and quality-
enhancing measures.  
 
Evidence: 
Most existing studies on Chile do not strictly focus on the assessment of the “municipalization” 
process itself but compare, often through cross-section education production functions which 
include dummies to capture the type of school management,  the performance of  municipal with 
private subsidized schools (which also receive the public sector subsidy) to assess relative 
management efficiency and see how competition impacted the quality of municipal schools.  
We provide below a general storyline of what the Chilean experience of decentralization with 
“choice” seems to have shown. 
 
During the 1980s, following the introduction of the per-student subsidy, enrolment increased 
considerably in the private voucher schools (from 14% in 1980 to 32% in 1990) and, controlling 
for socio-economic status, private subsidized schools seem to perform better than municipal 
schools (see Carciofi, Cetrangolo and Larranaga, 1996, Carnoy and McEwan, 1999b), pointing to 
positive effects of  competition on private schools’ performance. However, it is generally 
recognized in the studies that are largely centred on the 1980s period (see Carciofi, Cetrangolo 
and Larranaga, 1996, Carnoy and McEwan, 1999a and Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002) that 
competition among private and municipal schools was hampered by the lack of incentives and 
capacity of the municipal sector to compete (existence of soft budget constraints at the municipal 
level, restrictions on municipal decision-making and lack of autonomy and accountability of 
municipal schools), lack of clear information on relative school performance, and some “cream-
skimming” (advantaged and more able students migrate to private schools thanks to informational 
advantages and private schools select students)
19. As a consequence, the available evidence 
                                                 
18 This point is developed in the comments of Mariano Tommasi to Galiani and Schardrodosky, 2002. 
Tommasi mentions that: “education might have become the focus of provincial electoral concerns”. 
19In particular, McEwan and Carnoy (1999a), adopting both a first-difference and difference-in-difference 
specification over the 1982-1996 time period, estimate the impact of competition on public school quality 
and  reach the conclusion that competition did not lead to increased quality, mentioning the lack of  
municipal school autonomy as one of  the main reasons for this; while Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) find that   24
generally suggests that overall enrolment and quality (admittedly difficult to measure in the 1980s 
because of the absence of comparable test scores) did not improve over the 1980s (and 
divergence among schools increased)
20. From the decentralization and accountability perspective, 
we can say that the poor results of the municipal sector were probably mostly due a gap between   
responsibility and authority to act, the presence of soft budget constraints for the operation of the 
municipal education sector, the lack of  citizen participation mechanisms at the local level 
(mayors appointed, lack of local participation bodies)  and the “missed opportunity” of exploiting 
the  potential of the “client power” relationship as instrument to improve competition between 
public and private schools, due to the reasons just mentioned plus the lack of municipal school 
autonomy and the information and selection constraints on the demand-side.  
 
In the 1990s, on the one hand, further constraints on municipal autonomy (teacher statute of 
1991) and centrally driven interventions in favour of  the poorest/weakest municipal schools  
complicate even more the working of competition between municipal and private schools (see Di 
Gropello (2002) for the negative impact of the teacher statute
21 and Sapelli and Vial (2002) for 
the negative impact of central interventions on competition through the differences in per-capita 
budget between the two types of schools that they imply); on the other hand, dissemination of 
standardized school scores (SIMCE scores), increased administrative and pedagogical municipal 
school autonomy, introduction of school co-financing and better monitoring of student attendance 
(through the provinces) improve the operation of the voucher system. Additionally, in an attempt 
to create more national consensus and strengthen “voice”, mayors were elected in 1992 and   
municipal management was made more participatory  in 1995/1996. Overall, average test scores 
improve during the 1990s for all school categories and there is increasing convergence between 
all these school categories (i.e. municipal vs. private, subsidized or not, and private subsidized vs. 
private schools)
22. The studies centred on the 1990s  generally confirm that private subsidized 
schools perform better than municipal schools (see Sapelli and Vial, 2002
23) and have improved 
their performance due to  strong incentives to compete (decision-making autonomy, reliance on 
the voucher or parent co-financing, etc), therefore concluding that competition/choice was helpful 
in improving the quality and efficiency of schools (Gallego, 2002
24). However, the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                 
communities with higher private enrollment shares saw public school performance fall from 1982 to 1988, 
concluding to important negative effects of  “cream-skimming”.  
20 A study from Schiefelbein (1992) shows, insofar as test scores are really comparable over the 1980s 
which is not quite the case, that overall test scores were at best stagnant over the 1982-1990 time period 
and that while high income students (mostly enrolled in private schools) tended to have an improvement in 
their results, middle or low income students (enrolled in municipal schools) saw their results decrease.  
21Di Gropello (2002), through the estimation of an expanded education production function covering 50 
municipalities and more than 500 schools  over the 1992-1996 time-period, attempts to assess the impact of 
decentralization measures in different areas on test scores taking advantage of the variability among 
municipalities in the “de-facto” application of autonomy measures. The results show that partial measures 
of  financial and labour decentralization at the municipal level were negatively related to educational 
achievement because of the constraints imposed on municipal management. 
22 A study of Cox and Gonzalez (1998) shows increasing overall SIMCE scores in the 1990-1996 time 
period and a decreasing gap between municipal and private schools.  Additionally, there are also 
indications that within the same municipal sector, test scores became slightly more homogeneous across 
schools. Gallego  (2002) shows convergence among private non-subsidized schools and subsidized schools 
in the 1988-1999 time period. 
23 Sapelli and Vial (2002), using the new individual data available for the 1998 SIMCE test score, estimate 
the average treatment effect parameter and treatment on the treated for those students effectively choosing a 
private voucher school, controlling for the selection bias caused by school choice.   
24 Gallego (2002), using roughly 5,000 Chilean schools in the 1994-97 period and econometric techniques 
robust to endogeneity, presents empirical estimations that show a positive and relevant effect of   25
competition on the performance of municipal schools remains more controversial, with some 
studies (see Gallego, 2002) finding  that the improved municipal performance was largely due to 
competition (hampered by compensatory programs but enhanced by other measures-see above), 





The lack of a clear compact mechanism between the center and the 
states/municipalities is shown to have led to a variety of  experiences with different 
outcomes. Educational achievement outcomes and enrollment [in particular in poor 
areas] have substantially improved after the 1996 FUNDEF reform, largely due to 
an effective use of the “compact”, within a framework of extensive authority 
decentralized to states and municipalities, and to an effective use of teacher 
management. Spending efficiency varies, however, among municipalities depending 
on local skills and the working of “voice”.  
 
Evidence: 
No formal, quantitative assessments have been made of Brazil as a whole because of the size of 
the country. Additionally, since the delivery system has been decentralized since the 1930s it is 
difficult to isolate and study a clear decentralization moment/phase. It is clear that, as for 
Argentina, the lack of a clear compact mechanism between the center and the 
states/municipalities, led to a variety of  experiences with different outcomes, which are 
documented under the form of case studies generally mostly qualitative in nature. If it is therefore 
impossible to provide an overall assessment of the reform.  
 
In 1996, there was, however, a particularly innovatory reform which introduced a new financing 
mechanism (the so-called FUNDEF) which collects resources from state and municipal 
governments in a single fund and re-distributes them to the state and municipal systems according 
to the amount of students enrolled in each system to address the divergence between resource 
needs and availability (a national per-student spending floor is also established to ensure 
minimum levels of spending in all states and municipalities). A recent study undertaken by the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2003) on the impact of this  reform on resources, incentives and 
outcomes found that this new resource allocation system between states and municipalities led to 
a renewed “municipalization” process in the whole country which was very effective in 
increasing enrollment (the net enrollment rate increased from 89% to 96% in the time period 
1996-2000), in particular in the poorer states of the north and north-east (where education 
spending per student also increased the most). Additionally, as shown through a formal 
econometric analysis
25, “municipalization” was also significantly associated with better indicators 
of educational achievement (higher pass rate and lower drop-out rate and age-for-grade 
distortion). What has been  at work here is the combination between a strengthened “compact” 
relationship (fiscal transfers tied to students) clearly aimed at increasing enrollment and a “voice” 
                                                                                                                                                 
competition on the results of subsidized schools (more so for the private subsidized ones which face 
incentives more directly related to performance, but also municipal schools improved).   
25 Since information was available for both 1996 (before the FUNDEF reform) and 2000 (after the 
FUNDEF reform), both a cross-section and a first-difference model, aggregated at the municipal level, 
could be estimated, exploiting the change in space and in time of the indicators (additional resources, 
expenditure composition and level of “municipalization” were the three main independent variables in a set 
of regressions attempting to explain drop-out rate, age-for-grade distortion and passing rate).   26
accountability mechanism working generally well at the municipal level (also recently 
strengthened by the creation of social councils in municipalities and states) which led to 
“rational” resource allocations where municipal capital and personnel expenditures were 
generally related to system needs (while competition between municipal and state delivery 
systems, which was also supposed to be promoted by the per-student subsidy, does not seem to 
have played a major role
26). Still, it was also found that some municipalities use resources more 
productively than others, depending on local skills and the effective implementation of “voice” 
(through the social councils). Finally, the reform was  implemented within a consensual 
framework and also gave special emphasis to improving the salaries, qualifications, career 
prospects and performance of teachers, in particular in the municipal sector (among other 
interventions, 60% of FUNDEF resources have to be spent on the payment of teachers). 
  
B. Available case studies on the “sub-national shared responsibility” model 
 
The reforms in Bolivia and Colombia were implemented within a generally consensual 
framework with an objective of  promoting democratization and re-distributing political power 
among actors. As  such, as we have seen above, they have attempted to involve several actors in 
the provision creating a complex system of accountability relationships.  
There are generally no formal evaluations of these models, with the exception of the study of  
Faguet on Bolivia (Faguet, 2000), which is however only focused on intermediate quality 
indicators, but some qualitative/quantitative assessments that provide clear insights on the 




Poor implementation of the compact relationship and the same shared nature of  
responsibilities for the provision of the services hampered the effectiveness of the 
decentralization process in Colombia. In spite of increasing spending, enrollment 
and its distribution across socio-economic classes stagnated during the 1990’s. 
 
Evidence: 
Evaluations made by Gomez and Vargas (1997) and Borjas and Acosta (2000), focused on 
intermediate quality, efficiency and equity indicators, make it clear that the Colombian service 
delivery model is a problematic one essentially because of the way the compact relationship 
between levels of delivery was designed and  implemented and  because of the same shared 
nature of  responsibilities for the provision of the services which makes the creation of an 
effective accountability system particularly difficult.  On the compact relationship, three central 
problems were: (a) the lack of an information/monitoring system at all levels to assess if the 
departments implement the national norms for the administration of teachers and the use of the 
financial resources transferred to the different levels;  (b) the complexity and lack of transparency 
of the fund allocation formulas still too much focused on costs while at the same time trying to 
introduce indicators of efficiency and equity difficult to measure and monitor which ended up 
leading to inefficient and unequal resource allocation  across geographic areas; and (c) the 
“accreditation” process which, while representing an innovatory way of addressing institutional 
constraints to service delivery, was implemented so as to leave too much leeway to the 
                                                 
26 Among the reasons for this is the scarce comparative information available on the quality of state and 
municipal systems and the fact that municipalities and states often divided the provision of primary 
education among themselves following the following pattern: 1-4 grades municipalities and 5-8 grades 
states.   27
departments, ending up being driven by political more than technical considerations. The 
dispersion of responsibilities across political actors, while it can make sense to suit broad 
democratization objectives and the specificities of each actor, complicates substantially the   
working of the accountability relationships because of the absence of  a level clearly responsible 
for service delivery and the confusion that could arise from an unclear distribution of 
responsibilities among actors: in Colombia, for instance, the initial compact relationship was put 
under strain because the division of responsibilities brought the departments to be relatively 
uninterested in the final delivery of the service leading them to make unequal allocations of 
teachers across municipalities. This unequal allocation, together with soft budget constraints at 
the municipal level, would then bring these same municipalities to also hire teachers, at the cost 
of   investment and/or running deficits, blurring the division of responsibilities and leading to 
inefficient allocation of resources. Additionally, under these circumstances, also the voice 
relationships at both levels were weakened as citizens found it difficult to express their 
preferences to actors which have only partial and/or unclear responsibility on the provision of the 
services. The only available evidence on outcomes, with no formal link made to the reform, 
however, suggests that while education spending increased substantially in Colombia over the 
1990’s (from 3.2% of GDP in 1990 to 4.5% in 1997), enrollment rates tended to increase slightly 
between 1991 and 1994 and stagnate, or even decrease, between 1994 and 1998 (Borjas and 
Acosta, 2000). No convergence between enrollment rates of different socio-economic strata can 
be noticed.  
 
We should note that, without a formal evaluation of the reform but with the elements provided by 
several partial assessments and, above all, a “learning by doing” type of experience, it was 
formally decided to introduce a substantial modification of the Colombian decentralization 
reform in 2001 (Law N. 715, December 2001) along two main lines: (a) the simplification of 
resource allocation, through the creation of a General Co-Sharing System (“Sistema General de 
Participaciones”) which includes all funds directed to education and allocates them according to 
students enrolled; and (b) the unification of the responsibilities at the level of only one political 
actor (department or municipality), accompanied by the automatic “accreditation” of all 
municipalities with more than 100,000 habitants and a possible “accreditation” of all 
municipalities assuming they fulfill certain minimum institutional conditions. Doing so the 
country has decided to give up the shared responsibility model altogether taking the path, slowly 
but surely, of a “municipalization” model or at least of  a “geographically” differentiated model 
where the department would have full responsibility on the delivery only when the municipality is 




The shared responsibility model led municipalities to over-invest and the role of 
departments is still unclear. However, following the decentralization reform, 
investment in education became more progressively distributed and more 
responsive to local needs, due an effective use of “voice”.    
 
Evidence: 
A study made by Ruiz and Giussani (1997) on Bolivia, also largely focused on intermediate 
indicators, finds the same “potential” accountability problem in Bolivia (potential because the 
Bolivian reform was much less advanced than the Colombian one in 1997) and fears that, by 
being only responsible for school infrastructure, municipalities might over-invest, not taking into 
account recurrent needs.  This is  another possible outcome of  the same initial division of 
responsibilities which might not be all negative if investment is low and voice is effectively   28
expressed at the local level so as to produce a distribution of investment spending proportional to 
local needs. In fact, the study of Faguet (2000), through rigorous econometric analysis
27, finds 
that decentralization: (a) through the application of  the per-capita criterion resulted in a massive 
shift of resources in favour of smaller poorer municipalities; (b) changed the composition of 
capital spending, away from economic production and large scale infrastructure, towards 
education, urban development and water and sanitation; and (c) led public investment to become 
more responsive to local needs as illustrated by the fact that investment in education increased 
where literacy rates were low.  Assuming a not too strong imbalance with recurrent costs, this is a 
positive consequence of the Bolivian reform which, however, seems to be much more the product 
of a deep democratization reform, combined with a clear destination and allocation rule of the 
resources transferred to the municipalities, than of the shared responsibility model itself. 
Democratization, beyond local elections, promoted the creation of civic organizations at the local 
level with the specific purpose of overseeing municipal spending and propose new projects (the 
Oversight Committees, or “Consejos de Vigilancia”)
28, and a participatory planning process, 
through the elaboration of the “Development Municipal Plan”. In fact, it is noticeable that the 
“voice” and “compact” relationships could be fairly well handled, more effectively than in 
Colombia, even within this shared model   (the role of the departments was, however, still much 
less defined in Bolivia than in Colombia in 2000 leaving lack of clarity in the area of human 
resource management).  
 
C. Available evidence on the “school autonomization” model 
 
Where more formal assessments exist is on the decentralization models that put the focus on the 
schools. In particular, the two decentralization experiences of Nicaragua and El Salvador were 
thoroughly evaluated.  
 
Nicaragua and El Salvador 
 
In Nicaragua, school-based decisions on teacher management are shown to have a 
positive impact on test scores. In El Salvador, enrollment in the rural areas 
increased massively  following EDUCO and it is shown that school-based decisions  
on teacher management have a positive impact on class attendance or, even, test 
scores. In both models, these positive results are the product of a well designed and 




                                                 
27 More specifically, a formal test of whether decentralization changed the pattern of public sector 
investment in Bolivia is undertaken by decomposing investment patterns into 3 terms (a state effect, which 
captures all of the characteristics of a state fixed in time, a year effect, which captures year shocks and 
time-specific characteristics, and a decentralization-interacted state effect, which captures state-specific 
characteristics commencing in 1994 which were previously absent (this term captures the effects of local 
government, local civic associations and other local institutions that sprang up with the reform)) and 
performing different tests on the coefficients. 
28 The role of civic organizations in the aggregation of preferences, representation of community needs and 
mediation of community participation in the production of public services, as the need for analyzing why 
certain civic organizations are more successful than others (the extent to which citizens are able to make 
local government do things for them), is particularly stressed by Faguet (2000).   29
The evaluation of the Nicaragua’s reform has been underway since 1995, undertaken by a team of 
the Ministry of Education and the World Bank’s Research Group, and has produced a number of 
special school-household surveys and informal assessments
29 which have allowed a continuous 
monitoring of the reform in time, constituting, as such, a unique case in Latin America.  In 1998, 
King and Ozler (1998), building on these past assessments and data collection, attempted to 
undertake a particularly thorough evaluation by estimating an expanded education production 
function which allows for the estimation of the impact of decentralization by comparing 
autonomous schools with non-autonomous and private schools
30. Their study finds that school 
management, measured by the degree of autonomy of the school, is an important determinant of 
student performance and, more specifically, disaggregating the school autonomy measure, that 
schools that take more decisions on teacher management (hiring and firing of teachers, 




A similarly thorough evaluation was also made of the El Salvador’s EDUCO model in 1998 by 
Jimenez and Sawada (1998) and in 2004 by Sawada and Ragatz (2004). The first thing to say is 
that there is clear evidence that EDUCO, which was firstly conceived as a way to expand 
educational access in the rural areas, was successful in doing so (starting from a much lower point 
in 1990, the gross and net enrolment rates are currently higher in the rural than in the urban area 
in El Salvador [NER: 100% and GER: 132%] and we know that EDUCO schools were the main 
enrolment driving force in the rural area in the 1990’s). Taking this as a basis, the first study, 
estimating expanded education production functions which use three measures of educational 
achievement
32 and allowing the estimation of the impact of school autonomy by comparing 
EDUCO with traditional rural schools
33, attempts to explore if this expansion came at the expense 
of learning. It finds that, not only educational achievement is not any lower in EDUCO than in 
traditional schools (which is good since students in EDUCO are usually from the most 
disadvantaged backgrounds), but that students in EDUCO schools miss less school days due to 
teacher absences than traditional school students. The second study, estimating the first and 
second-order effects of EDUCO schools  through regression analysis and controlling for sample 
selection and unobservable bias when measuring the impact of EDUCO vs. traditional schools, 
finds that EDUCO teachers have more motivation, as measured by spending more time meeting 
with parents and other school members, being absent less and dedicating more time to teaching, 
and that this increased motivation has a positive impact on student performance.   
 
Looking at these results, two points that come to mind is that school autonomy, at least in certain 
functional areas, seems to be a very promising reform, and that this reform, to be effective, should 
be accompanied by both a strong, well-designed “compact” relationship between the center and 
the schools (the supervisory system put in place in El Salvador is an example of what might be 
                                                 
29 See Nicaragua Reform Evaluation Team (1996), Fuller and Rivarola (1998) and King, Ozler and 
Rawlings (1999).   
30 The model, which covers almost 2,000 students in about 90 schools at the primary and secondary level in 
1996, also allows for non-random selection of schools into the decentralization reform (schools, at least in 
the first stage of the reform, were generally either chosen by the MOE or convinced to volunteer and, as 
such, cannot be considered entirely random) and corrects for sample attrition. 
31 At the primary level, were each school to increase its real decision-making power by one standard 
deviation (i.e. approximately by 20% more decisions) the average math score would increase by 6.7%: this 
effect size is twice as large as that of textbooks, 1.5 times that of teacher’s education and 1.4 times that of a 
one-standard-deviation reduction in class size. 
32 Standardized tests in Spanish and math and school-days missed by a student due to teacher absence. 
33 The model, which covers 192 schools and 897 students in 1996, also corrects for endogenous selection of 
schools by the parents.    30
needed), and a strong “client power” relationship. Regarding this last relationship, there is 
evidence that EDUCO parents’ associations visit classrooms 4-5 times more often  than what 
parents would do in traditional schools: this most certainly explains why teacher absences are 
lower. In Nicaragua, the tight association between school autonomy and parent participation is 
also likely to be an important element in explaining why school decisions on teacher management 
issues are positively related to educational quality: in particular, there is evidence that parents are 




Other evidence suggests that school autonomy in several areas increases test scores 
and other educational achievement indicators and that the impact of autonomy is 
strengthened by the use of “client power”. It is also shown that “client power” only 
has an impact combined with school autonomy. Finally, school autonomy, or 
increased school decision-making in local decisions,  can promote convergence 




The relation between autonomy and participation at the school level is also particularly looked at 
in a study of  Eskeland and Filmer (2002) on Argentina, where, through the estimation of an 
expanded education production function where the impact of school autonomy and parent 
participation on test scores is captured through “de-facto” measures of autonomy and 
participation per school
34, they find a composite index of  school autonomy  (including decision-
making autonomy in the teacher management area) to be significantly and positively related to 
exam scores and  the marginal impact of this index to be increasing with the level of participation. 
The study also finds that parent participation only works on test scores through autonomy and 
that the impact of autonomy (as well as the enhancing effect of participation) increases for poor 
and public sector schools. These results suggest that: (a) school autonomy, even if limited,  is 
effective in promoting higher quality; (b) school autonomy effectiveness increases with the level 
of participation, or, the strength of the “client power” relationship; (c) this “client power” 
relationship only becomes effective when there is school autonomy, which; and (d) school 
autonomy can be useful in increasing the performance of poor schools (and promote convergence 
with richer schools).  
 
The complementarity between school autonomy and parent participation, and the need for more 
specific analysis of other determinants  of the impact of school autonomy on educational 
performance, is  illustrated in a recent study of Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1998) on Brazil. 
This study, using an education production function analysis which exploits the variation in space 
and time of  educational innovations to test the impact on test scores and other educational 
achievement indicators (such as school repetition, out-of-school-youth and age-for-grade 
distortion) of three measures of school autonomy (financial autonomy, election of principals and 
the adoption of school councils) 
35, finds a generally positive and substantial impact of the three 
innovations on school repetition. It also finds, however, that, even if still significant, the three 
                                                 
34 The study, which covers 20,000 students drawn from a representative sample of private and public 
Argentinian schools, also attempts to address the issue of the potential endogeneity of autonomy and 
participation. 
35 The model, run on the 18 states between 1981 and 1993,  takes particular care to control for variables like 
the quality of family environment and teachers which could be correlate with the innovative States.   31
innovations explain only about half of the modest variation of out of school children and age-for-
grade distortion over the time-period 1981-1993, that the impact of financial autonomy and 
election of principals is significant but small in explaining test scores and the one of school 
councils not even significant. A possible explanation for this heterogeneous and often weak 
impact lies in the uncoordinated adoption of these innovations in the Brazil states. While a 
majority of the states were, for instance, transferring funds to the schools and had school councils 
in the early 1990’s, only four of them implemented these innovations at the same time, while in 
the others these measures were  unsynchronised, subject to reversals, etc. The results also suggest, 
however, that even the combination of these measures might not necessarily be successful in the 
same way in all states, suggesting the  need for more specific analysis of  the institutional 
characteristics of the environment in which school autonomy develops. 
 
A recent study of Di Gropello and Marshall (2004), using regression functions to  measure the 
first and second-order effects of  PROHECO (autonomous) schools and controlling for sample 
selection bias, finds that school autonomy in the administrative area, in combination with higher 
community monitoring, translates into better capacity utilization in PROHECO schools,  
under the form of less school closings, more individualized learning, higher frequency of 
homework, etc, and that, in turn, differences in school capacity utilization explain a substantial 
proportion of the observed differences in academic achievement between PROHECO and control 
schools.  
 
Finally, Di Gropello (2002) shows that there is a significant positive relationship between test 
score and the level of pedagogical decentralization of the school and that there is an improvement 
of municipal intra-area equity, i.e. that the relation between the socio-economic level of the 
municipal school and school educational achievement is weaker, when schools have a more 
active role in local decision-making (which would suggest that giving more responsibilities to 
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